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FREEDOM OF THE PRIVATE-UNIVERSITY
STUDENT PRESS:
A CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSAL
BRIAN J.

STEFFEN,

PH.D.*

It has long been established in First Amendment
jurisprudence that the federal Constitution protects the press
against state action but not private action. The Constitution not
only prevents Congress from passing laws that abridge the
freedom of speech,' but also protects Americans from the acts of all
governmental bodies and officials at the federal and state levels
that would abridge the First Amendment's guarantees. Despite
tentative steps by the United States Supreme Court from the
1940s through the 1960s to extend First Amendment protection to
guard against censorship by private authorities,' the private sector
remains largely immune from the free expression commands of the
Constitution.
Among those private organizations that need not observe
First Amendment rights of free expression are private institutions
of higher education, many of which operate some of the largest and
most respected journalism programs in the nation.3 While courts
* Associate Professor and Chair of Communication Studies, Simpson
College, Indianola, Iowa. B.A., 1981, Iowa State University; M.S., 1987, Iowa
State University; Ph.D., 1995, University of Iowa.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Court reversed the
conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who had been found guilty of trespassing on
the property of a privately owned "company town," Chickasaw, Ala., because
the town fulfilled a "public function" that required respect of constitutional
rights. Id. at 507-09. Similarly, the Court ruled in Amalgamated Food
Employees Union, Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza. Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 314-20
(1968), that owners of privately owned shopping centers also must permit
citizens to distribute political literature on their premises, although the Court
later backed away from the Logan Valley Plaza ruling in Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 561-65 (1972), and Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,
518-21 (1976). See also infra notes 102-110 and accompanying text (discussing
these rulings in greater detail).
3. Of the ten largest undergraduate journalism programs in the nation in
Fall 1998, four were operated at private institutions - Emerson College,
Boston University, Syracuse University, and the University of Sacred Heart.
Lee B. Becker et al., Annual Enrollment Report: Number of Students Studying
Journalism and Mass Communication at All-Time High, JOURNALISM AND

The John Marshall Law Review

[36:139

have long granted students at public universities virtually the
same level of First Amendment protections afforded the
commercial press,4 judges have balked at providing the same
constitutional shield for students and faculty enrolled and working
at private schools and universities.5
Despite strong philosophical and policy considerations that
support granting free speech rights to private university students,6
the highest form of press freedom is almost certainly unavailable
to student journalists at private institutions of higher education
According to the Student Press Law Center in Washington, D.C.,
the answer to whether private-university students have any legal
rights to protect them from censorship and punishment by
university officials is, at best, a "resounding maybe."" While much
of the speech regulation at private universities relates to "hate
speech," private university administrators have also censored or
punished student journalists for publishing information school
officials find embarrassing or critical of university philosophies,
policies, or administrators. Examples of this censorship in recent
years include:
* A student at the College of the Ozarks in Missouri left
school after college officials pressured him to shut down The
College Record, an alternative to the college's "official"
newspaper, The Outlook. Even though the student, Pat
Nolan, published a disclaimer noting the newspaper had no
connection with the school, college officials said they received
calls from Nolan's advertisers who believed Nolan used the
school's name to sell ads.9

MASS COMM. EDUC., Autumn 2001, at 28.
4. See generally Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass.
1970), Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973), Kincaid v. Gibson, 236

F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001).
5. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 843 (1982) (holding that a
private high school for troubled students need not observe First Amendment
rights of a teacher fired for criticizing school officials). See also Powe v. Miles,

407 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that a private university need not
provide procedural safeguards for students suspended for protesting the
Vietnam War).

6. As an example, officials at American University in Washington, D.C.,
follow a trend set by many private schools in their voluntary recognition of
First Amendment rights for their students. Student Press Law Center,
American U. Approves New Freedoms, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REP.,
Spring 1998, at 6.

7. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text (discussing how the U.S.
Supreme Court has failed to issue a ruling on the question).
8. Student Press Law Center, Private Schools and Press Freedom (1995),
available at http://www.splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=8 (last visited Oct. 14,
2002).
9. Student Press Law Center, Unofficial student paper not welcome,
STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REP., Spring 1997, at 21-27.
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* University officials at Jacksonville University in Florida
removed the school newspaper's student editor and faculty
adviser after the newspaper, The Navigator, published a
satirically risque photograph of a male beauty pageant. The
university placed the editor, Angie Koury, on disciplinary
probation for publishing the photograph. °
* The Associated Student Government at Northwestern
University, home of one of the nation's most prestigious
schools of journalism, withdrew its recognition of the
Northwestern Chronicle student newspaper. The student
government's move resulted in denying free office space to
the newspaper that the University provides to other student
organizations. The Chronicle, noted for its conservative
political views, was reinstated as a student organization after
actor Charlton Heston, a Northwestern alumnus, joined
several faculty members from the Medill School of
Journalism publicly in urging university administrators to
reverse the student government's decision."
* Some observers have noted a trend toward censorship of the
student press at historically black universities. Pearl L.
Stewart, a "roving journalist" for the Black College
Communication Association, said "[t]here's a perception by
administrators at many black colleges that they are
misrepresented and portrayed in a negative light by the
mainstream media more often than are white institutions, so
they're not inclined to support student newspapers on their
campuses that might treat them the same way." The
Chronicle of Higher Education has focused on censorship at
Clark Atlanta University, where officials stripped the student
newspaper of funding after the students
reported that toxic
12
materials were used in art classes.
Despite judicial resistance to acknowledging constitutional
protection of free speech and press at private colleges and
universities,13 the function of higher education in the United
States suggests that such protections should be recognized, to
some degree, under the federal Constitution. This is especially
important at a time when the student press' liberty-even at public
universities-has been the subject of judicial rethinking in one

10. Student Press Law Center, Editor, adviser removed after printing
photos, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REP., Spring 1997, at 25.
11. Student Press Law Center, Conservative paper gains recognition,
STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REP., Winter 1998-99, at 30.
12. Leo Reisburg, Student Press at Black Colleges Faces a 'New Wave of
Censorship',THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 3, 2000, at A47.
13. Powe, 407 F.2d at 75. See also Greenya v. George Washington Univ.,
512 F.2d 556, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that higher education does not
trigger state action as regards First and Fourteenth Amendment safeguards).
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circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals. 4 The rights of privateuniversity student journalists have always been considered in
comparison with their counterparts at public institutions, and any
evisceration of press rights at public universities would
doubtlessly embolden officials of at least some private universities
to tighten their control over student publications. 5
This article makes the case for a qualified First Amendment
protection for student journalists that would balance their rights
with the institutional needs and the rights of trustees, alumni,6
administrators, and other supporters of private institutions.'
Such a position attempts to strike a balance between those who
argue the First Amendment should have no application
whatsoever to private colleges and universities 7 and those who
would "transport" First and Fourteenth Amendment norms to the
private sector requiring the same kind of First Amendment
interpretations at private and public universities."
This article reaches its conclusion by first considering the
current state of First Amendment law as it pertains to student

14. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has ruled that
public university officials may not censor student journalists in an effort to
protect the university's image from negative publicity likely to follow
publication of a student yearbook of "poor" quality. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236
F.3d 342, 345-51 (6th Cir. 2001). Kincaid overturned an earlier ruling of a
panel of the appeals court that would permit "reasonable" restrictions on
student press freedom at the collegiate level. Id. at 729.
15. The Student Press Law Center reports that it fielded 321 complaints
from university student journalists about censorship by college officials in
1998. The center's record keeping does not differentiate between complaints
about censorship at public and private universities. Student Press Law
Center, High School Censorship Increases, 1998 SPLC Legal Requests
Indicate, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REP., Fall 1999, at 3. While this paper
and the SPLC document claims of censorship of private university student
media, there are no reported court decisions involving constitutional claims of
student journalists at private schools.
16. See generally infra notes 203-21 and accompanying text.
17. See Randall Kennedy, Private Universities and the First Amendment,
THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 21, 1994, at B1 (providing support
for the notion that First Amendment protections should be extended into
private universities). See also Julian N. Eule, as completed by Jonathan D.
Varat, TransportingFirstAmendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every
Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1547-55 (1998) (arguing
that the First Amendment should not apply at private institutions).
18. See Erwin Chemerinsky, More Speech is Better, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1635,
1638-39 (1998) (writing in response to essays written by Julian Eule that "the
most important insight in Julian's article is that laws transporting First
Amendment norms to the private sector interfere with the free speech
interests of private entities."). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution
and Private Schools, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, 274-89 (Neil L.
Devins, ed., 1989)(noting proponents of transporting First Amendment
protection to the private sector).
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journalists at private universities. 9 This article compares the
press freedoms at public universities with press freedoms at
private universities focusing on the diminishing differences
between the two. This article then analyzes and criticizes the
development of the "state action" doctrine as a means of
implicating constitutional values in the actions of theoretically
private parties.
Next, this article considers alternatives to federal
constitutional protection of press freedoms for private university
students." Students and faculty may be able to rely on policy
arguments; assertions of association; contract and property rights;
claims of academic freedom; statutory provisions; and state
constitutional provisions to fight censorship and punishment of
speech and press activities. However, this article criticizes the
shortcomings and legal uncertainties affiliated with these
approaches.
Finally, this article proposes and outlines a limited First
Amendment right of free press for student journalists at private
schools.2 The article bases this approach on a Meiklejohnian
theory of the First Amendment and argues that that a balancing
approach offers advantages to institutions as well as individual
students and faculty.
I.

CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR PRIVATE
UNIVERSITY STUDENT JOURNALISTS

A.

The FirstAmendment and the Public-University Student Press

Student journalists at private universities are protected by
the same First Amendment provisions as other journalists,
student and commercial, when it comes to censorship and
punishment by the state for speech and press activities. However,
as a result of several federal cases arising from the Vietnam era,
only student journalists at public universities receive speech
protections similar to those of the commercial press from actions
by university officials. An early U.S. District Court case on the
subject of press freedom for public-university students, Dickey v.
Alabama State Board of Education," illustrates this principle.
Dickey arose from a Troy State University student journalist's
desire to applaud the president of the University of Alabama for
supporting the speech rights of radical student groups protesting
the Vietnam War."2 But the policy riled Alabama's governor and

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See generally infra Section I.
See generally infra Section II.
See generally infra Section III.
273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
Id. at 616.
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some state legislators, and Troy State's president forbade the
student newspaper at his institution from publishing the
supportive comments."4 The editor of the student newspaper
complied but published the word "censored" in the spot where the
story would have run." For this, the university suspended the
student journalist."
A federal district court ordered him
reinstated and followed the rule of Tinker v. Des Moines
27
Independent Community School District
that public-school
officials could not abridge the speech and press rights of their
students absent a showing that the expression would "materially
and substantially interfere with [the] requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school." 8
The U.S. Supreme Court first acknowledged the First
Amendment rights of public university students in Healy v.
James," a case prompted by Central Connecticut State College's
refusal to recognize a local chapter of the Students for a
Democratic Society ("SDS").30 The college's president based his
refusal on the conclusion that the national SDS followed a
philosophy of disruption and violence that conflicted with the
college's policy on student rights.2 ' Recognition by the college
would have permitted the local chapter to meet in campus
buildings and would have provided it access to campus bulletin
boards and the school newspaper." The Court faulted the college's
refusal to recognize the chapter, concluding "state colleges and
universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First
Amendment."2 Ruling that university officials should be granted
less deference in regulating student speech and press than was
granted to secondary-school officials in Tinker, the Court in Healy
found no
[r]oom for the view that, because of the acknowledged need
for order, First Amendment protections should apply with
less force on college campuses than in the community at
large. Quite to the contrary . . .[t]he vigilant protection of
24. Id.
25. Id. at 617.
26. Id.
27. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
28. See Dickey, 273 F. Supp. at 618 (quoting Burnside v. Boyars, 363 F.2d
744 (5th Cir. 1966)). Other federal district courts adopted the Dickey rule in
quick succession: Snyder v. Bd. of Tr., 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill.
1968);
Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188, 192 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Zucker v.
Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Smith v. Univ. of Tenn., 300 F.
Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn, 1969); Close v. Lederle, 303 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Mass.
1969); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass. 1970).
29. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
30. Id. at 170.
31. Id. at 175.
32. Id. at 176.
33. Id. at 180.
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constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools. 4
The Court argued it was not breaking new ground in Healy,
but simply reaffirming the nation's "dedication to safeguarding
academic freedom."" In particular, the Court noted its rulings in
36
Sweezy v. New Hampshire
and Keyishian v. Board of Regents"
that established First Amendment protection for academic
freedom at public universities. Even on public university
campuses, however, the Court recognized limitations on First
Amendment rights.38 Consistent with the rule of Tinker, the Court
found in Healy that "[a]ssociational activities need not be tolerated
where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or
substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to
obtain an education." 9 Accordingly, the Court remanded Healy for
further proceedings to determine the extent to which the local SDS
chapter would materially and substantially disrupt the college's
educational mission, stating "[wie do conclude that the benefits of
participation in the internal life of the college community may be
denied to any group that reserves the right to violate any valid
campus rules with which it disagrees.""
A year after Healy, the Court explicitly extended First
Amendment freedoms to student journalists at public universities
in Papish v. Board Of Curators.4 In Papish, Missouri University
suspended a graduate student, who worked at an underground
newspaper affiliated with the SDS, for distributing copies of the
publication that included "indecent" language. 2 Despite the
publication's coarse language, the Court ruled that university
officials were not justified in disciplining the student stating,
"[W]e think Healy makes it clear that the mere dissemination of
ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a state university
campus may not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of
decency.'
34. Id. (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
35. Id. at 180-81.
36. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
37. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
38. Healy, 408 U.S. at 189.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 193-94.
41. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 670. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) Chief Justice Burger dissented
from the Papish ruling, as did Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Blackmun.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger argued:

[I]t is not unreasonable or violative of the Constitution to subject to
disciplinary action those individuals who distribute publications which
are at the same time obscene and infantile. To preclude a state
university or college from regulating the distribution of such obscene
materials does not protect the values inherent in the First Amendment;
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Both Healy and Papish had their roots in Tinker," a case
arising from silent Vietnam War protests staged at a secondary
school in Des Moines, Iowa. However, thirty years of judicial
deference to administration decisions to limit student speech at
public secondary schools as well as universities has eviscerated
Tinker's force. As a high-water mark in the recognition of student
speech and press rights, Tinker cannot be divorced from the
political and social realities of the time in which it was litigated.
Neither can the erosion of student rights since that time, as
observed by Thomas C. Fischer:
[T]imes did change, and significantly so. The Vietnam War
opened political divisions that grew violent. The overblown
promises of salvation through education failed to produce the
expected return. Recession hit the U.S. economy and it lost
hegemony in world markets. We as a people became less
enchanted with liberalism and idealism, and became more
fiscally and politically conservative. And so did Supreme
Court judgments regarding student and teacher rights.8
The Supreme Court's 1989 ruling in Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, a case involving free press rights at a public
high school, represents the Court's most significant divergence
from Tinker." The student press at public universities avoided a7
similar fate when the Sixth Circuit ruled in Kincaid v. Gibson
that Hazelwood should not apply at the collegiate level.
The Court in Hazelwood found that a public high school
principal did not violate the First Amendment by removing two
pages of the student newspaper from the publication. 8 The
principal said he acted because he believed that the student
reporters failed to exercise the professional standards of
journalistic balance and fairness in gathering information for one
rather, it demeans those values.
Id. at 672.
In his dissent, Rehnquist argued Papish's speech was not subject to First
Amendment protection because it fell within the "fighting words" exception
and could disrupt order at the university:
The notion that the officials lawfully charged with the governance of the
university have so little control over the environment for which they are
responsible that they may not prevent the public distribution of a
newspaper on campus which contained the language described in the
Court's opinion is quite unacceptable to me, and I would suspect would
have been equally unacceptable to the Framers of the First Amendment.
Id. at 677.
44. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
45. Thomas C. Fischer, "Whatever Happened to Mary Beth Tinker" and
Other Sagas in the Academic "Marketplace of Ideas", 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 351, 359 (1993).
46. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
47. Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 342.
48. 484 U.S. at 274.
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of the stories. 9 He also believed that the content in another story
was inappropriate for underclass high school students." Ruling in
favor of the school district, the Court found that public school
districts need not tolerate speech that is inconsistent with their
educational missions and that might bear their imprimaturs.51 As
a consequence, the Court concluded school officials should be
granted latitude in regulating the content of student newspapers
because they are pedagogical tools and not public forums created
by government for the discussion of public issues. 2
Critics warned that the Hazelwood ruling could have dire
consequences for the student press at the college level, even
though the Court stated in a footnote that it "need not ... decide
whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect
to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and
university level." 3 Nevertheless, university officials used
Hazelwood to justify censoring the student press at public
universities, at least until the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Kincaid v.
Gibson. 4
Kincaid arose from two constitutional claims by students at
Kentucky State University. One challenged a university decision
to withhold distribution of the university's student-produced
yearbook, The Thorobred, because of the publication's poor
quality.55 The other concerned the students' claim that university
officials were attempting to control the student newspaper, The
Thorobred News, by intimidating student journalists and
pressuring its faculty advisor to publish only positive stories about
the institution." Following the Supreme Court's ruling in
Hazelwood, the appellate court panel found the yearbook was a
nonpublic forum and deferred to the university's judgment in
declining to release it:
It is no doubt reasonable that KSU should seek to maintain
its image to potential students, alumni, and the general

49. Id. at 263.
50. Id.
51. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266-67.
52. Id. at 267-70.
53. Id. at 273-74 n.7.
54. 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001).
55. Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d at 723. Officials objected to the theme of the
1992-94 yearbook, to the yearbook editor's choice to include photos about
current events of no immediate connection to the Kentucky State University
campus and the lack of captions on many photos. Id.

56. Id. at 724. Defendant Gibson is alleged to have directed the adviser,
Laura Cullen, to prohibit the newspaper from publishing a letter to the editor

and to "convince" students to publish more positive news in the newspaper. Id.
When Cullen refused on First Amendment grounds, she was transferred
without notice from her advising position to an unspecified position in the
university's housing office. Id.
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public. In light of the undisputedly poor quality of the
yearbook, it is also reasonable that KSU might cut its losses
by refusing to distribute a university publication that might
tarnish, rather than enhance, that image. 7
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in a rehearing, en banc,
overturned the panel's ruling in 2001, holding that the student
media at Kentucky State were limited public forums and that the
university had violated Kincaid's First Amendment rights. '
In the uncertain legal climate created by the differing rulings
among federal district and circuit courts, hundreds of student
journalists have reported attempts by university officials to censor
and punish student journalists in recent years.59 Common methods
of restricting the press at public universities include sensitivitybased censorship in the form of speech codes, suppressing critical
information about universities and administrators, and restricting
advertising content." This suppressive legal climate at public
university gives private college officials further authority to
regulate the student media on their campuses. Examining the
roots and contemporary function of private higher education in the
United States serves as a prelude to an argument that a form of
the same constitutional protections available to public university
students should protect student journalists at private institutions.
B. The Nature of PrivateHigher Education
Higher education in the United States has its roots in the
private sector.
Many early American jurists felt privatized
education was necessary to maintain the quality of education as
well as aristocratic order. Chief Justice John Marshall, writing in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,"' distinguished
between public education-"a civil institution to be employed in the
administration of government"-and the elite private college-"a

57. Id. at 729. One judge on the appeals panel dissented and found KSU's
yearbook to be a limited public forum. Id. at 731 (Cole, J., dissenting). The
panel's ruling has been vacated pending an appeal to the Sixth Circuit en banc
in 2000. U.S. Court of Appeals throws out its initial decision in censorship
case, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REPORT, Winter 1999-2000, at 4-5.
58. Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 346. The full appeals court also concluded that
Hazelwood was "only marginally" applicable to Kincaid. Id. at 346 n.5.
59. Thirty percent of the 771 requests for legal help to the Student Press
Law Center in 1996 concerned college censorship. Legal requests from high
schools reach record high at SPLC in 1996, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REP.,
Fall 1997, at 3. In 1997, thirty two percent of 795 complaints to SPLC
concerned censorship. High School Censorship Calls Soar in 1997, STUDENT
PRESS LAW CENTER REP., Fall 1998, at 3.
60. Greg C. Tenhoff, Censoring the Public University Student Press: A
ConstitutionalChallenge, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 511, 512 (1991).
61. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
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private eleemosynary institution."62 Noting this distinction, the
Court invalidated a New Hampshire law increasing the
Dartmouth College's board of trustees as a means of promoting
greater public oversight over the institution's operations. Indeed,
the Court found that the government did not have an interest in
regulating the affairs of private colleges and universities because
they "do not fill the place, which would otherwise be occupied by
government, but that which would otherwise remain vacant.""
Chief Justice Marshall's philosophy has remained a principle
of the public-private distinction in higher education for more than
180 years. But even if accepted in 1819, Marshall's
characterization of a neat distinction between public and private
education64 is significantly blurred today. In many ways, the
differences between public and private universities have
diminished as public higher education has grown in size and
influence. An American system of public higher education
developed in the nineteenth century and grew to dominance in the
twentieth century, particularly in the years after World War II.
Today, a shrinking proportion of all American college students
receive their higher education in private universities.6 5 Those who
do pursue a private education are likely to receive substantial
amounts of federal and state financial aid to help finance their
education. 6
In spite of the costs, millions of prospective students and their
parents continue to seek out private education for a number of
reasons.67 Degrees from elite schools, such as those in the Ivy
League, provide perceived economic and professional benefits,
which seem to justify the financial investment and academic
62. Id. at 640-41. An eleemosynary institution is one "of, relating to, or
supported by charity." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 460 (4th
ed. 2001).
63. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 647.
64. Robert O'Neil argues that Marshall's position did not reflect reality,
even in 1819. Robert O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFF. L.
REV. 155, 157 (1970).
65. The U.S. Department of Education says the percentage of all college
students pursuing a private liberal arts education has shrunk from about fifty
percent in the mid-1960s to one in five currently. Martin VanDerWerff, The
Struggle to Define a Niche for a Liberal-Arts Institution, THE CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 17, 1999, at A39.
66. The average cost of tuition, room, board and mandatory fees in 2001-2
was $26,070 at private residential universities, compared to $11,976 for

resident students attending public universities. THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUC.,
Average
College
Costs,
2001-2002,
available
at
http://chronicle.com/free/v48/il/10a05201.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).

67. The U.S. Department of Education estimated that 3.2 million students
were enrolled in private two- and four-year institutions of higher education in
1999. Projections of College Enrollment, Degrees Conferred, and High-School
Graduates, 1997 to 2008, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION ALMANAC,
Aug. 28, 1998, at 19.
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competition. Private universities of lesser reputation attract
students with a focus on teaching and mentoring, as well as
provide numerous and less threatening opportunities in athletic,
social, and co-curricular activities.68
There is little evidence that prospective students seek out
private higher education in order to be insulated from ideas. Yet
some commentators argue the First Amendment should not apply
at such schools. In the view of some, it is precisely because the
institution is private that many students and parents seek it out:
Although private institutions have always been more
expensive to attend than public institutions, private higher
education has been a vital and influential force in American
intellectual history. The private school can cater to special
interests that a public one often cannot serve because of legal
or political constraints. Private education thus draws its
strength from the very possibility of doing something
different than government cannot do, or creating an
institution free to make choices government cannot-even
seemingly arbitrary ones - without having to provide a
justification that will be examined in a court of law.69
Writing more than thirty years ago, Christopher Jencks and
David Riesman argued the primary reason students and parents
sought out private universities at that time was the schools'
emphasis in developing, or deterring, certain kinds of social
connections:
Parents may know, for example, that the faculty at the
University of Colorado is better than at the University of
Denver, and may nonetheless prefer Denver on the grounds
that their daughters will be less likely to marry the wrong
man at Denver, or that their sons are more likely to make
friends who will be useful in later life. Or they may want
their children to go to college only with other girls, only with
Seventh Day Adventists or only with whites."
In the private university setting, opponents argue, the
"marketplace of ideas," a traditional philosophical justification for
freedom of speech,7 may not be a desirable element. Randall
68. One of the leading attractions of private universities is their relatively
small size. In Fall 1996, 1,502 of the 1,633 private, non-profit universities in
the United States had enrollments of less than 5,000 students. By comparison,
only 927 of 1,645 public universities had enrollments of less than 5,000
students. Number of Colleges by Enrollment, Fall 1996, THE CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUC. ALMANAC, Aug. 28, 1998, at 18.
69. WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 45 (Jossey-Bass Publishers 1995).
70. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS
AND DAVID RIESMAN,
THE ACADEMIC
REVOLUTION 287 (Doubleday 1968).
71. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting, Holmes wrote "ftihe ultimate good desired is better
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Kennedy of the Harvard Law School, writing on the advisability of
"hate speech" codes at private institutions, argues, the "lone,
distinct [private] scholarly institution" should not even voluntarily
abide by the dictates of the First Amendment:
One reason that some institutions are quick to accept the
dictates of the First Amendment is that all too frequently
educators give little sustained thought to the content and
boundaries of their educational mission. They assume that
any and every college should be a marketplace of ideas. But I
can easily imagine a vibrant, rigorous, intellectually
distinguished college whose governing authorities reject such
a notion. I have in mind a college whose authorities focus on
something else: a core set of values and knowledge that is
inculcated and transmitted by a carefully and tightly planned
program of instruction.
While the fact that a private university is a nongovernmental
entity doubtlessly appeals to some students and parents, 3 most
students likely perceive no effective difference between the public
and private university with respect to freedom of expression. 74
reached by free trade in ideas ...[t]he best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."). See also
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (writing "[tihe classroom
is peculiarly 'the marketplace of ideas."'); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 617-18 (Random House 1970) (describing the
function of a university in democratic culture); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM 125-47 (Harper 1965) (discussing intellectual freedom
and the integrity of universities).
72. Randall Kennedy, Should Private Universities Voluntarily Bind
Themselves to the First Amendment? No!, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC.,

Sept. 21, 1994, at B1-B2. The author continued:
The college would include those ideas and people that administrators
thought would be helpful in advancing this program and exclude those
thought to be distracting. I can easily imagine, that is, a first-rate
Catholic or conservative or feminist or socialist university at which the
curriculum, hiring of faculty, and rules regarding access to the campus
by outsiders were governed by policies aimed at infusing the student
body with the college's overarching religious or ideological commitments.
Id.
73. Many private universities have affiliations with religious faiths,
meaning that students and faculty are provided opportunities for religious
reflection on their work, but most do not insist on a faith requirement or even
mandatory participation in religious worship or other activities to become a
member of the student body or faculty. The Roman Catholic Church is among
the faiths with the largest number of institutional affiliations with 230
colleges and universities in the United States. Beth McMurtrie, Bishops Issue
New Guidance on Catholic Colleges' Adherence to Church Teachings, THE
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 1, 1999, at A18. The United Methodist
Church counts 102 colleges and universities, enrolling more than 250,000
students, among its affiliates. United Methodist-Related Colleges and
Universities
and
Theological
Schools,
available
at
http://www.gbhem.org/gbhem/colleg.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
74. Evan G.S. Siegel, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The
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Beyond institutions requiring students to affirm religious or other
beliefs as a condition of matriculation, few students attending
private colleges and universities are aware of the institution's
overarching ideological commitments. Indeed, few parents or
students indicate an aversion to free speech as a reason for
selecting and remaining at private universities. Practically
speaking, most prospective students are more interested in
pursuing an education that will make them marketable in
professional and graduate school markets. Put another way, the
private nature of the institution is less important to most
prospective students than is the institution's ability to provide
other academic and social benefits. Among the factors that
prospective students take into account in choosing private higher
education are the following:
*Academic factors: George Dehne & Associates, a consulting
firm that tracks enrollment trends for private colleges, says
that its surveys of 7,000 prospective college students show
the most important factor for students choosing colleges is
not the "values" espoused by the institution or its status as a
private or public university. 7 Rather, the firm finds students
are interested in colleges 6 that offer major fields of study in
which they have interest.
# Environmental factors: The Dehne firm finds that small
colleges, most of which are private, often struggle in the
current environment to attract quality students. Dehne's
survey shows prospective students are more interested in
attending "universities" than they are "colleges" because of
the perception that the former are more urbane. More than
seventy percent of prospects desire to go to school in an urban
or suburban environment rather than in the more-isolated
areas where the smallest liberal arts schools are located.
Such a competitive environment, notes The Chronicle of
Higher Education, makes for a precarious future for many
small, private schools: "[Unless they have name recognition,
a sizable endowment, or especially strong academic offerings,
most [small liberal arts] institutions struggle to attract
students from outside their regions. " "
,Retention factors: The notion that students seek out private
higher education to be exposed to values, which may argue
against the unregulated competition of ideas, is not
Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J.
1351, 1378-88 (1990).
75. Martin VanDerWerff, The PrecariousBalancingAct at Small Liberal
Arts Colleges, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., July 30, 1999, at A32-34.
76. Id. at A33.
77. Id.

78. Id. at A34.
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supported when one considers the reasons students choose to
leave such institutions. Private universities, dependent on
tuition revenue for their financial health, have intensified
their retention efforts in recent years. Partly due to cost, but
also partly due to academic and social factors, students
transfer or drop out of private universities after one year at
rates ranging from 8.8 percent for students attending elite
schools (those that typically accept the top ten percent of
high-school graduates) to 27.7 percent among traditional
schools (attracting students from the top fifty percent of their
classes) to as much as fifty percent for those schools with
open enrollment policies. 9 While academic reasons are
obviously a leading cause of student dropouts, personal,
social and financial reasons are most often cited as a reason
for a student to leave a private university, factors similar to
those at public institutions. 9
* "Consumer"factors: Evidence suggests that students choose
to enroll and stay at private universities for many of the
same personal reasons that they choose consumer products. A
combination of costs and personal satisfaction with the
benefits of the institution, rather than commitment to
institutional values, is crucial in this regard. Betsy 0.
Barefoot, co-director of research and publication at the
University of South Carolina's National Resource Center for
the First-Year Experience, notes the challenges many private
universities face in attracting and retaining students:
"There's more of a consumer mentality among students now,
and less of a sense of institutional loyalty. Students are more
apt to transfer to a place where the grass is greener."'
Such evidence shows that most students attending private
universities are drawn not by the religious or values-based nature
of the education, but rather by the academic and social factors that
make the private school much more akin to the public university
than Marshall's 1819 analysis would imply. As a result, traditional
arguments differentiating between private and public higher
education have less force today than they had during earlier eras.
Consequently, one can argue for extending First Amendment
protections to private institutions within the "state action"
doctrine, which applies constitutional standards to the actions of
theoretically private parties.
C. State Action and Private Universities
Because prospective students discern little effective difference
between private and public institutions of higher learning, many
79. Leo Reisberg, Colleges Struggle to Keep Would-Be Dropouts Enrolled,
THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 8, 1999, at A54.
80. Id.
81. Id. at A55.
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commentators argue students and faculty at private colleges and
universities should be brought under the protections of such
constitutional provisions as the First Amendment.82 Courts have
adopted this view in other contexts. While they have often ruled
that private colleges must follow federal laws respecting
affirmative action, anti-discrimination and other civil rights,83 they
traditionally refuse to grant students and faculty at private
institutions the same constitutional protections afforded their
counterparts at public universities.84 The judicial system typically
relies on the "state action" doctrine in finding private universities
immune from respecting the constitutional protections of free
speech and press for its students.
This doctrine, a fundamental principle of constitutional law
for more than a century, holds that only the state or a private
party closely related to the state may be liable for violating
constitutional rights. " The actions of purely private actors need
not conform to constitutional standards. 6 The nature of state
action has expanded and contracted at various points in American
history, but the doctrine's primary purposes have remained the
same for more than a century: to protect individual freedom by
defining zones of private conduct beyond the power of the state to
regulate,87 and to preserve state sovereignty and, thus,
federalism.88
The state action doctrine has its roots in the Civil War
amendments to the Constitution and had its earliest judicial
interpretation in the Civil Rights Cases." Authorized by the
Fourteenth Amendment's provision that Congress shall have the
authority to enforce political equality by "appropriate legislation," °
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 guaranteed all Americans the "full
and equal enjoyment" of public accommodations such as inns,

82. See generally Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Private Schools, in
MORE SPEECH IS BETTER, supra note 18, at 274-89; Chemerinksy, supra note
18, at 1635; O'Neil, supra note 64, at 155; Robert C. Schubert, State Action
and the Private University, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (1970); Siegel, supra note
74, at 1378-1400; Richard Thigpen, The Application of Fourteenth Amendment
Norms to Private Colleges and Universities, 11 J.L. & EDUC. 171 (1982).
83. ROBERT O'NEIL, FREE SPEECH IN THE COLLEGE COMMUNITY 218-39
(1997).
84. See Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that although
New York State College of Ceramics is located at Alfred Academy, a private
university, it is to be treated as a public school).
85. Id.
86. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
87. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1594 (2d ed. 1991).

88. Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Private Schools, supra note 18, at
276.
89. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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restaurants, theaters and railroads."' But the Supreme Court, with
Justice Joseph Bradley writing for the majority, invalidated the
law for stepping "into the domain of local jurisprudence, and
[laying] down rules for the conduct of individuals in society
towards each [other], and imposes sanctions for the enforcement of
those rules without referring in any manner to any supposed
action of the State or its authorities."92 While acknowledging that
the Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress power to wipe out
"badges and incidents" of slavery, the Court found that a refusal of
one private party to do business with another private party was
not a vestige of the old order:
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to
make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person
may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to
the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit
to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of
intercourse or business.93
Despite the neat public-private distinction Bradley's opinion
suggested, Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissent94 presaged later
debates on the nature of private power and the applicability of the
Constitution in prohibiting private abridgements of rights. Harlan,
who believed exercises of private power could be as oppressive as
the actions of the state, argued that the Court's ruling rested on
grounds "entirely too narrow and artificial." 9 He wrote:
[In] every material sense applicable to the practical
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, railroad
corporations, keepers of inns, and managers of places of
public amusement are agents or instrumentalities of the
State, because [they are charged with duties to the public,
and are] amenable, in respect of their public duties and
functions, to [governmental] regulation.96
Because of the close relationship between the operations of at
least some private parties and the obligations of the state, Harlan
believed constitutional guarantees should protect individuals from
individuals and corporations that act under color of state law.97
Harlan's dissent eventually led to the development of a state
action doctrine that more clearly recognized the way power is
exercised in American society. In later years, courts were willing
to find constitutional values implicated in a variety of contexts
involving discrimination by private parties against other
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

18 Stat. 335 (1875).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 26-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 36.
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individuals. These theories included the "nexus" strand of state
action, in which the discriminatory actions of private parties
cannot proceed without some involvement by the state;98 situations
in which private parties exercise powers delegated by the state;99
and the dependence of a private party on state funding for a
substantial source of its revenues.' With regard to private
educational institutions, the most promising theory of state action
has been in the judicial system's recognition of a "public function"
in the operations of a private organization.
In a First Amendment ruling, Marsh v. Alabama,' the Court
adopted Justice Harlan's view on the importance of the presence of
a "public function" in a finding of state action. In Marsh, a member
of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith was convicted under a state
criminal trespass statute. for distributing religious literature on
the streets of Chickasaw, Alabama, without permission from the
private company that owned title to the town and used it to house
and provide services for workers.0 3 The Court concluded that
because these facilities primarily benefited the public, they
essentially served a public function, and were therefore subject to
constitutional mandates.' As a result, the private company could
not deny individuals their First Amendment rights to distribute
literature on the streets of the town.'0
Emboldened by the Marsh ruling, labor unions tried, with
mixed results, to force private property owners to respect First
Amendment rights in the 1960s and 1970s. In the first of the socalled "shopping-center" cases, Amalgamated Food Employees
Union v. Logan Valley Plaza,Inc. ,10the Court extended the rule of

Marsh to those kinds of private properties after finding that
shopping centers were quickly replacing downtown business
districts as functional "public squares" for speech and political
activity.0 7 The Logan Valley precedent was short-lived, however.
The Justices quickly retreated, ruling four years later in Lloyd
Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner,'° that a shopping center could exclude anti-

98. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 16 (1948) (holding that private
restrictive covenant amounts to state action when it requires state judiciary
for enforcement). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265
(1964) (holding state action implicated in an individual's request for judicial
enforcement of libel verdict against privately owned newspaper).
99. Schubert, supra note 79, at 334-48.
100. Id. at 341.
101. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
102. Id. at 503-04 (citing 14 ALA. CODE § 426 (1940)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 506.

105 Id.
106. 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968).
107. Id.
108. 407 U.S. 551, 565-68 (1972).
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war protesters whose message was not connected to the purposes
of the shopping center." 9 However, in 1976 the Court abandoned
Logan Valley, ruling in Hudgens v. NLRB11 that shopping centers
were not engaged in state action and therefore need not respect
First Amendment liberties."'
Marsh and the shopping-center cases clearly establish that
some private properties fulfill public functions amenable to
constitutional protection. As public spaces shrank and greater
privatization of the venues of public communication took place, so
did the opportunities for meaningful dissent from public policies.
During the conservative turn of the Court in the 1970s and 1980s,
however, the Supreme Court began to chip away at the idea that
private interests, which served public functions of any kind, need
be bound by the limits of the Constitution. Rulings in the 1990s,
however, have left open the possibility that the Court could later
expand the "public function" strand of state action analysis to
include censorship of the student media at private universities.1
It is difficult to argue private higher education does not fulfill
a public function in American society. Chief Justice Marshall's
views in Dartmouth College notwithstanding, the "mixed economy"
of public and private higher education is now such that private
universities remain so more in name than in reality. Several
factors have diminished differences between public and private
universities in the late twentieth century. Private schools
gradually have become more secularized and more dependent on
governmental grants and financial aid. Further, and more
109. Id.
110. 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976).

111. Id.
112. Rulings during the 1970s and 1980s limited application of the public
function doctrine only to private activities engaging in an "exclusive
government function." Accordingly, the Court refused to find a public function
in the actions of a variety of private bodies. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 357-59 (1974) (private utility); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 165-66 (1978) (private warehouseman); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982) (private high school for troubled students); Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1012 (1982) (private nursing home); and San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543-44
(1987) (amateur sports governing body). However, in Edmonson v. Leesville

Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), the Court held that the controlling
test in determining whether a private party's public function is sufficient to
find state action is "whether the action in question involves the performance of
a traditional function of the government." Id. at 624 (emphasis added). Not
only did the Court in Edmonson veer from the "exclusivity" test used in its

1970s and 1980s decisions, it also determined that a combination of factorspublic function, nexus, state regulation, etc-could be used to justify an
overall finding of state action. Id. For a larger treatment of the development
of the public function strand of state action analysis, see G. Sidney Buchanan,
A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for
Governmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 385-89 (1997).
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importantly, the demand for higher education expanded during
the twentieth century to such an extent that it would have been
impossible for either the public or private sector to adequately
meet it without overcrowding. With regard to public universities,
the growth of private development organizations raising hundreds
of millions of dollars from alumni and corporate patrons has made
those institutions operate in a much more "private" manner than
13
in previous eras."
Judge J. Skelley Wright aptly summarized the
public function of private higher education in 1962:
Institutions of learning are not things of purely private
concern... No one any longer doubts that education is a
matter affected with the greatest public interest. And this is
true whether it is offered by a public or private
institution....
Clearly the administrators of a private
college are performing a public function. They do the work of
the state, often in place of the state. Does it not follow that
they stand in the shoes of the state? And, if so, are they not
then agents of the state, subject
to the constitutional
14
restraints on governmental action?'
Nonetheless, most courts have refused to find a sufficient
connection between the state and private educational institutions
to make First Amendment guarantees binding on private
schools." ' Powe v. Miles" illustrates the blurring line between
public and private higher education, as well as the steps to which
courts will go to protect private university officials in limiting
expression on campus. In Powe officials at Alfred University in
New York suspended seven students for protesting against the
'
Vietnam War during a campus ROTC ceremony. 17
Three of the
seven suspended students were enrolled in the New York State
College of Ceramics, which Alfred operated under contract with
the state government." 8 The remaining students were liberal arts
majors at Alfred, all of whom were unaffiliated with the ceramics
school.1 '9 This distinction was crucial in the court's finding that

113. O'Neil, supra note 64, at 170-80.
114. Guillory v. Adm'rs of Tulane Univ., 203 F.Supp. 855, 858-59 (E.D. La.
1962).
115. However, courts have had no such difficulty in requiring that private
universities abide by federal laws prohibiting discrimination in admissions
and hiring "on the basis of race, sex, national origin, religion, handicap or
age." See Siegel, supra note 74, at 1389 (writing that "with only a few narrow
exceptions, private universities which receive federal funds may not
discriminate on the basis of race, sex, national origin, religion, handicap, or
age."). See also O'NEIL, supra note 80, at 227 (noting that private universities
are subject to some federal regulation).
116. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
117. Id. at 78.
118. Id. at 79.
119. Id.
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university officials had violated the constitutional rights of only
the ceramics students. The court found no true public function in
the operation of the university as regarding liberal arts students. 2 '
Neither would it find a sufficient nexus with the state nor a
significant dependence on state funding-other than for the
ceramics college-to necessitate a finding of state action. 21 While
officials at Alfred could choose to observe constitutional
guarantees for its liberal arts students, they were under no legal
requirement to do so.' 22
While the Second Circuit in Powe addressed the issue, the
Supreme Court's major statement on the relationship between
private education and the state came in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 22 a
1982 case in which a private secondary school in Massachusetts
fired a faculty member for publicly criticizing the school's
administration.' 4 Even though the school received up to ninety
nine percent of its annual budget from state tax receipts to help
educate troubled youths, the Court declined to find state action in
the teacher's dismissal. Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote, "[t]hat
a private entity performs a function which serves the public does
not make its acts state action" unless "the function performed has
been traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State." 2' Justice
Thurgood Marshall, joined in dissent by Justice William Brennan,
would have found state action in the school's actions on both a
nexus and a public-function theory.1 2 6 According to Justice
Marshall, "[tihe fact that a private entity is performing a vital
public function, when coupled with other factors demonstrating a
close connection
with the State, may justify a finding of state
27
action.",
Thus, any argument that the First Amendment should apply
to private institutions of higher education must contend with a
judicial ideology that has become increasingly unwilling to take
constitutional issue with the actions of private parties. The bar,
however, while set high, is not insurmountable.
One method of analyzing and critiquing the existing "state
action" doctrine as it relates to speech is to utilize what Matthew
120. Id. at 80.
121. Id.

122. Id. at 81-82.
123. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 830.
124. Id. at 834.
125. Id. at 842. The Court has since stepped back from the "exclusivity"
requirement in public-function analysis. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991) (establishing that the controlling test in
determining whether a private party's public function is sufficient to find state
action is "whether the action in question involves the performance of a
traditional function of government.").
126. Id. at 840.
127. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 849 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Bunker has called the "new realist" critique of existing First
Amendment jurisprudence.'28 Named for the legal realists of the
New Deal era who used insights into economic and social theory as
a means of reshaping conservative judicial ideology and finding
support for the economic reforms of the Depression era, the new
realists operate under a variety of conceptual and theoretical
guises, such as critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, critical
race theory, etc.' 29 While these approaches have several significant
differences in their approaches to questions of communication law
and policy, they all are concerned with the ways private power can
be used to silent unpopular or marginalized viewpoints.
Essential ideas in these discourses are that private power can
be just as oppressive a censor as the state, and that constitutional
values must be applied against this form of power to realize true
political and social equality. These approaches are themselves
subject to criticism,'3 ° but they are helpful as a means of
theoretically grounding a broader right of constitutional protection
for speech and press on the private university campus.
II.

OTHER METHODS OF PROTECTING SPEECH AT PRIVATE SCHOOLS

While free-press advocates have not often found the First
Amendment to be a helpful tool in finding protection for student
publications on private campuses, other legal arguments have
been advanced in support of these claims. This section of the
article presents some of these arguments and analyzes why they
all suffer from deficiencies in effectively promoting the values of a
free press.
A. Policy Considerations
One of the most common arguments in favor of free-press
rights on the private campus is rooted in philosophical
considerations. As noted by the Student Press Law Center (SPLC),
environments supposedly dedicated to free inquiry and often
promoted as such in marketing materials should live up to the
ways they bill themselves.'.' "Any official censorship of a
128. Matthew D. Bunker, Constitutional Baselines: First Amendment
Theory, State Action and the "New Realism," 5 COMM. L. & POL'Y 1 (2000).
129. Id. at 3-10.
130. Bunker finds much of the new realist critique problematic and argues
that, for actionable state action to be present, government must "act" in
concert with the private actor through constitutional, statutory, or commonFurther, Bunker argues that an "identifiable, willing
law authority. Id.
speaker" must be suppressed in order to find state action and that courts
should avoid balancing the rights of speakers against each other. Id. Finally,
courts should not become involved in the adjustment of "preference baselines"
that would substitute the values of the judiciary for those of the marketplace

of ideas. Id. at 28-30.
131. Student Press Law Center, supra note 8.
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newspaper, whether by a private school administrator or a state or
local government official seems patently un-American.' 32 Indeed,
few universities willingly admit they regulate speech and press
activities on campus, even if they legally retain the right to do so,
because of the stigma that naturally attaches to such actions.
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., deftly stated a version of the policy
argument more than seventy years ago:
Private schools and colleges sometimes desire to take on ...a
military form, and exert autocratic powers over their
students and teachers .... It is doubtful whether the
students, parents, and teachers contemplate such authority
as inherent in the nature of an educational institution.
Consequently, the ordinary principals of natural justice
might well be applied even if the rules of the organization are
expressly contrary .... It is easy to understand how
educational authorities believe that they will secure
efficiency and desired standards through the possession of
absolute powers. However, an institution which professes to
prepare youth for life in a democracy might wisely give them
an example of fair play when it is conducting its own
affairs.133
SPLC also argues that censorship on the private university
campus "retard[s] one of the basic necessities of the learning
process-the unfettered free flow of ideas.' 34 SPLC further
maintains that a failure to respect First Amendment values at
private institutions-many of which have religious affiliationsendangers the vitality of the amendment's guarantees of free
exercise of religion.'3 '
B. Academic Freedom and Contract Rights
Despite these policy considerations, however, private
university officials have not hesitated to act as censors when they
believe their personal or institutional interests warrant it. As a
result, many student journalists have argued that rights of
contract and association protect their expressions in the student
press. ' According to SPLC, private schools that grant freedom-ofexpression rights in handbooks, student media charters, or other
policies and regulations could be held to those standards by a
court.3 7 "[A]ny action contrary to that policy is a breach of

132. Id.
133. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for

Profit, 43 HARv. L. REV. 993, 1026-27 (1930).
134. Student Press Law Center, supra note 8.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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[contract] for which a court could [grant] relief."38 However, rightof-contract or academic-freedom arguments are at best tentative
solutions to the problem of censorship at private institutions.
Many private universities grant students and faculty some form of
"academic freedom" without defining the meaning of the term.
Further, some commentators argue that academic freedom
protects students and faculty only when they are engaging in
extramural speech-that is, speech concerning issues and ideas
regarding the world beyond the campus.139 Intramural
communication that concerns or criticizes internal1 40university
policies or governance is not protected under this view.
C. State ConstitutionalFree-ExpressionProvisions
In a few states, the best resort may be to the provisions of the
state constitution. Forty-two states word their free-expression
guarantees in terms broader than that of the federal
Constitution."' Such state constitutions are said to embody
"affirmative" rights of speech and press because the provisions
make no specific requirement
of state action for constitutional
14
values to be implicated.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., ROBERT K. POCH, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS 8-9 (1993) (stating that the
American Association of University Professors has, since 1915, considered the
meaning of academic freedom to be freedom of "extramural utterance and
action" in the form of thought, inquiry, discussion and teaching).
140. AAUP has been critical of the amorphous nature of academic-freedom
policies at private institutions, particularly church-related institutions. It
urges that "limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims
of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the
appointment [of a new faculty member]." AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 3 (1990).

141. See Note, PrivateAbridgement of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90
YALE L.J. 165, 180-81 n.79 (1980) (listing states granting affirmative rights to
free speech). State constitutions with affirmative free-expression provisions
are: ALA. CONST. art. I, § 4; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, §
6; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 6; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10;
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para.
5-4; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7;
KAN. CONST. (Bill of Rights), § 11; KY. CONST. (Bill of Rights), § 8; LA. CONST.
art. I, § 7; ME. CONST. art. I, § 4; MD. CONST. (Declaration of Rights), art. 40;
MASS. CONST. art. 77; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3; MISS.
CONST. art. III, § 13; MO. CONST. art. I, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7; NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 5; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 22; N.J.
CONST. art. I, para. 6; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 17; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 14; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 4-9; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 22; PA. CONST. art. I, § 7; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 20; S.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 5; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 19; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8; VT. CONST. ch. I,
art. 13; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. I, §
20.
142. Many of the forty-two states word their affirmative guarantees in
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The Supreme Court has supported the right of state courts to
find more expansive protections of speech and press rights in state
constitutions than can be found in the federal Constitution."' In
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,' the Court ruled against
the owner of a shopping center who argued that the California
Supreme Court's protection of the speech rights of anti-Zionist
protesters at his shopping center was a denial of his First and
Fifth Amendment rights. Central to the Court's analysis was its
finding that the shopping center had opened its doors to
pamphleteers in the past and that it was unlikely that shoppingcenter patrons would identify the message of the pamphleteers
with the owner of the shopping center.'
A few states' constitutions extend speech and press
protections to cover abridgement by private parties. Two of those
states -- New Jersey and Pennsylvania -- have done so in cases
pitting the rights of private colleges against speakers.
New Jersey became the first state to employ its constitutional
expression provisions against a private university when its

similar terms. Three state constitutional provisions that have resulted in
expansive protection of speech rights against private infringement are as
follows:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may
not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a).
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all
prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as
libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable
ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the fact.
N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 6.
The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake to
examine the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of
government, and no law shall ever by made to restrain the right thereof.
The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the
invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and
print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. No
conviction shall be had in any prosecution for the publication of papers
relating to the official conduct of officers or men in public capacity, or to
any other matter proper for public investigation or information, where
the fact that such publication was not maliciously or negligently made
shall be established to the satisfaction of the jury; and in all indictments
for libels the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the
facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 7.
143. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1987).
144. Id. at 87.
145. Id.
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Supreme Court decided Schmid v. State,14 a case pitting Princeton
University's right to control the use of its property against the
speech rights of a non-student political activist.'47 Chris Schmid
was a member of the U.S. Labor Party responsible for distributing
political literature in an orderly manner on the Princeton
campus."" After declining a request to stop, local police arrested
149
Schmid and a local court convicted him on a trespass charge.
While the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to find state action
and an implication of First Amendment values in Princeton's

refusal to permit distribution of political literature on campus,' it
did find that Schmid's activities were protected within the scope of
New Jersey's state constitution."' The New Jersey court
pronounced a three-part test to balance the property rights of the
university with the speech rights of the public:
*What is the normal use of private property at issue?
*What is the nature and extent of the public's invitation by
the private property owner to use the privately owned
facilities?
*What is the compatibility of free-speech interests with the
normal uses of the property? 5
Applying this test, the New Jersey Supreme Court found
Princeton's overall mission was to spread ideas among its students
and the world beyond the campus.'' As a result, Princeton had a
lesser interest in censoring speech. 5" Princeton appealed the
ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the case was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction following oral arguments because Princeton
implemented new policies permitting the distribution of political
literature on campus."'
While Schmid distinguishes the private university campus
from other private forums for speech and press activities, New
Jersey's courts have not been willing to extend its protections to
all private post-secondary institutions of higher education. In
State v. Guice,'5 ' a New Jersey appellate court upheld the

146. 423 A.2d 615, 616 (N.J. 1980).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. The New Jersey court specifically refused to find a "public function" on
Princeton's campus analogous to the company town at issue in Marsh v.
Alabama. Id. at 624.
151. Id. at 626-33.
152. Id. at 630.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 630-31.
155. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 103 (1982).
156. 621 A.2d 553 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).
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trespassing conviction of students who had refused to stop
distributing political literature on the campus of Hamilton College,
a for-profit training school for business and clerical skills. In
Guice, the court found college officials had not traditionally opened
the campus to the public for reasons related to the dissemination
of ideas, as was the case in Schmid. Accordingly, unlike Princeton,
Hamilton officials had not forfeited control over the use of the
property.157
Citing Schmid as persuasive authority, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court made Pennsylvania's constitutional guarantees of
free speech and press binding on private colleges in
Commonwealth v. Tate.' Police had charged several protesters
with defiant trespass when they refused to stop distributing
leaflets at Muhlenberg College, at the time hosting a speech by
Clarence Kelley, then director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. "9 As the New Jersey court did in Schmid, the
Pennsylvania court in Tate found Muhlenberg had opened its
facilities to free public access, thus implicating state constitutional
norms."' The college could institute a content-neutral time, place,
and manner requirement by forcing protesters to first secure
permission before distributing literature on campus, but the court
found the college had not articulated any standards by which Tate
could seek permission.161

Even though New Jersey and Pennsylvania have applied
speech and press rights of individuals against some private
parties,6 ten states have refused to find any broader expression
157. Id. at 555.
158. 432 A.2d 1382, 1391 (Pa. 1981).
159. Id. at 1384.
160. Id. at 1391.
161. Id. at 1390. One Pennsylvania justice dissented from the majority and
urged his colleagues to conform Pennsylvania law with the federal standard in
Hudgens v. NLRB. To do otherwise, he wrote, creates confusion for property
owners and uncertainty in the law, while "chill[ing] the exercise of property
rights." Id. at 1391 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
In a later case, West. Pa. Socialist Workers v. Conn. Gen., 515 A.2d 1331
(Pa. 1986), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicated that it was the special
role of private universities in spreading ideas to the public that required they
respect state constitutional norms. The case concerned a trespassing charge
filed against political activists who were distributing literature at a shopping
mall. The court distinguished the case and Tate, noting that "In our view,
[Tate] demonstrates a limiting rationale for applying our constitution's rights
of speech and assembly to property private in name but used in fact as a forum
for public debate." Id. at 1336 (emphasis added).
162. Additionally, California, Colorado, and Washington have used their
state constitutions to find a right of free expression on private shopping-center
properties. See Bock v. Westminster Mall Co. 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991) (holding
that Colorado's constitution prevents a private property owner of enclosed
shopper center from prohibiting non-violent political speech); Robins v.
PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Calif. 1979) (holding that California's
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rights in their constitutions than is found in the federal
Constitution. 163 One commentator has referred to such "stateaction only" interpretations, similar or identical to that of the
federal Constitution,
as "uncritical" readings of those state
64
constitutions.1

Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not embody this
conception of state action, state courts are free to use a more
inclusive conception to enforce their state constitutional
guarantees. Indeed, state courts are the most appropriate
judicial institution for this task because both the public
interest in general speech and individual property rights are
defined exclusively under state law. 1
D. Other Statutory Provisions

Beyond state constitutional provisions, four states have
adopted legislation that some have argued protect speech and
press rights for speakers and publishers on private property. 16
constitution protects speech reasonably exercised in shopping malls);
Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envt'l. Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981)
(holding that environmentalists may gather in shopping malls).
163. See Cologne v. Westfarm Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201, 1202 (Conn. 1984)
(refusing to broaden state constitutional rights of free speech and petition to
permit individuals to exercise their rights of free speech on private property
without the owner's consent). See also Dept. of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455,
461 (Fla. 1982) (holding that the same scope of protection required under the
First Amendment is afforded to the state freedom of expression provision); Des
Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Iowa
1976) (holding that the federal and state provisions provide the same
protections); Freedman v. State, 197 A.2d 232, 235-36 (Md. 1964); rev'd on
other grounds, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (holding that the state constitution violated
federal speech protections); Woodland v. Mich. Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d
337 (Mich. 1985) (holding that state free speech protections do not reach to
private property); State v. Cox, 16 A.2d 508, 516-17 (N.H. 1940) (holding that
state and federal free speech protections are substantially similar); Shad
Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that free
speech protections did not prevent private property owners from instituting no
handbill policies); State v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d 708, 711-12 (N.C. 1981)
(refusing to broaden state free speech protections to permit individuals to
exercise their rights on private property without the owner's consent); Hunt v.
McNair, 187 S.E.2d 645, 648 (S.C. 1972) (stating that the First Amendment
and the state freedom of speech provision are interpretted the same); Rapid
City J. Co. v. Cir. Ct. of Seventh Judicial Cir., 283 N.W.2d 563, 568 (S.D. 1979)
(stating that state's freedom of speech protections extend no further than
federal protections).
164. Note, Private Abridgement of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90
YALE L.J. 165, 180-81, nn.80-82 (1980).
165. Id. at 182-83, nn.89-91.
166. The states are California, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 1993);
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3 1-51q (1997); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
TIT. 5 § 4681-82 (West 1990); and Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 12, §§
lH,

11I (1994).
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However, legal challenges to most of these laws have resulted in
court rulings that limit their application to private organizations,
including private universities. 67' Further, federal legislation
designed to extend First Amendment protections to students and
faculty at private colleges has either failed to win support in
Congress or lacked suitable enforcement provisions that would
give aggrieved parties standing to seek judicial relief. ' 8
Connecticut was the first to approve such legislation at the
state level. The Connecticut Free Speech Act of 1983"69 was
designed to remedy the "discrepancy" between constitutional
protections for governmental whistleblowers and those for private
employees who comment on matters of public concern. 7 ' The act
recognizes a private cause of action for damages against "any
employer," private or public, who disciplines or discharges
employees for exercising "rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution" or applicable
sections of the Connecticut state constitution.' 7' In Massachusetts,
the state Civil Rights Act of 1979 authorized similar causes of
action against "any person or persons, whether or not acting under
color of law" interfering "with the exercise or enjoyment" of "rights
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of
rights secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth."1 '2
Maine's statute is similar to those in Connecticut and
Massachusetts, though it adds a requirement that the denial of
constitutional rights be "intentional" in order to be actionable.' 3

167. See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 904
(1st Cir. 1988)(prohibiting racial discrimination, and not guaranteeing speech
rights, was object of state civil rights legislation); Cotto v. Sikorsky Aircraft
Div., No. CV93-0349697, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1355, at *3 (Conn. Super.
Ct. May 22, 1996) (holding that speech in private employer's workplace not
protected by First Amendment); LeBow v. Am. Chem. & Ref. Co., Inc., No.
112554, 1994 WL 411331, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 29, 1994) (holding that
Connecticut constitution does not protect speech on private property); Phelps
v. President of Colby College, 595 A.2d 403 (Me. 1991) (denying relief to
private-university students in free-speech case against private university).
168. See infra notes 182-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Collegiate
Speech Protection Act of 1991 and its ramifications).
169. See sources cited supra note 162 (citing state statutes).
170. See Eule & Varat, supra note 17, at 1587-88.
171. CONN. CONS. art. I, §§ 3, 4 & 14. Whether the provision would protect
students at private universities in Connecticut is uncertain, although many
student journalists at private institutions receive modest financial
compensation for their work and would arguably come under the heading of
"employees."
172. See sources cited supra note 162 (citing California, Connecticut, Maine
and Massachusetts statutes). Eule and Varat argue that the legislative intent
of the bill's sponsors did not include protection from censorship at private
universities. Eule and Varat, supra note 17, at 1581-82 nn. 190-94 and
accompanying text.
173. See sources cited supra note 162 (citing California, Connecticut, Maine
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Nonetheless, courts in all three New England states have
hedged on whether the provisions truly extend to censorship by
private parties.174 In Connecticut, one court has twice read the
statute as only protecting speech regarding private activities on
17
Further, a federal appeals court in
public property."
Massachusetts has limited the ability of plaintiffs to use that
state's law against private censorship.'76 In a case specifically
involving the free-expression rights of students at a private
university,177 the Maine Supreme Court concluded the applicable
state law did not intend to create a right of free expression
interfering with private relationships.17

California's so-called "Leonard Law," 79 named for the state
legislator who shepherded the bill through the State Assembly, is
the only state law to date specifically intended to protect speech
and press rights on private campuses that courts have upheld as
constitutional. s° The statute forbids any educational institution,
public or private, from disciplining students for speech and
publication that "when engaged in outside of the campus or facility
of a private post secondary institution, is protected from
governmental restriction" by the federal Constitution. 181 The law
provides that aggrieved students may seek injunctive and
declaratory relief.' 2 Exceptions to the law's requirements are
made to permit private schools to develop narrowly drawn hatespeech codes and for religious schools at which application of the
law "would not be consistent with the religious tenets of the
organization."'83 Supporters have called the legislation a "freeexpression Magna Carta for students,"8 4 and even critics have
labeled it a "bold stroke."'

and Massachusetts statutes).
174. Eule and Varat, supra note

17,

at

1587-90

nn. 216-27

and

accompanying text.
175. Cotto v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., No. CV93-0349697, 1996 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 1355, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 22, 1996); LeBow v. Am. Chem. &
Ref. Co., Inc., No. 112554, 1994 WL 411331, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 29,

1994).
176. Redgrave, 855 F.2d at 888.
177. Phelps v. President of Colby College, 595 A.2d 403 (Me. 1991).

178. Id. at 406.
179. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West Supp. 1996).
180. Corry v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb.
27, 1995) (holding that private university hate-speech policy is both facially

overbroad and underinclusive when measured against First Amendment
standards).
181. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(a) (West 1993).
182. Id. at § 94367(b) (West 1993).
183. Id. at § 94367(c) (West 1993).
184. Nat Hentoff, Magna Carta for Students, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1993, at

A21.
185. Eule and Varat, supra note 17, at 1593.
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At the federal level, Rep. Henry Hyde of Illinois proposed
legislation in 1991 that would have granted injunctive and
declaratory relief to students and faculty at some private colleges
who believed that campus speech policies infringed on their First
Amendment rights.'86 Like California's Leonard Law, the bill
would have created an exception for "religious institutions" for
which First Amendment standards would be inconsistent with the
mission of the college. Responding to critics' claims that such
legislation violates the First Amendment rights of private
educational institutions to disassociate themselves from messages
they find offensive or antithetical to their values, Hyde argued a
"right of dissent [would] hardly threaten the school mission or
identity, unless they are in tenuous shape to begin with."187 Unlike
the Leonard Law, however, the Hyde legislation never emerged
from committee.
In 1998, Congress adopted revisions to the Higher Education
Act, indicating its desire that private colleges respect freeexpression rights of students and faculty. A "sense of Congress"
section of the act"' provides that "no student attending an
institution of higher education on a full- or part-time basis should,
on the basis of participation in protected speech or protected
association," be punished for expressive activities that would be
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments at public
universities.'8 9 Private institutions, according to the legislation,
should respect those rights "whether or not such [expressive
19
activity] is sponsored or officially sanctioned by the institution.""
As with most federal legislation affecting colleges and universities,
the provision covers only those institutions that "directly or
indirectly [receive] financial assistance" under the act.' 9'

186. Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 1380, 102d Cong. (1991).
187. Henry J. Hyde & George M. Fishman, The Collegiate Speech Protection
Act of 1991: A Response to the New Intolerance in the Academy, 37 WAYNE L.
REV. 1469, 1493 (1991).

188. 20 U.S.C. § 1011a (2000).
189. Id. at § 1011(a).

190. Id.
191. Id. To conform with the spirit of the Supreme Court's rulings in Healy
and Papish another section of the legislation notes that nothing in the section

should be construed:
(1) To discourage the imposition of an official sanction on a student that
has willfully participated in the disruption or attempted disruption of a
lecture, class, speech, presentation, or performance made or scheduled
to be made under the auspices of the institution of higher education; or

(2) To prevent an institution of higher education from taking
appropriate and effective action to prevent violations of State liquor
laws, to discourage binge drinking and other alcohol abuse, to protect
students from sexual harassment including assault and date rape, to
prevent hazing, or to regulate unsanitary or unsafe conditions in any

student residence.
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The legislation, sponsored by Rep. Robert Livingston of
Louisiana and Sen. Larry Craig of Idaho, is a welcome step
forward for press rights on the private campus. As the SPLC has
noted, speech, as defined in the section, "would presumably cover
student expression in the pages of a student publication as well as
verbal expression. Thus a student editor or columnist could not be
punished for writing an article that was unpopular or offensive to
school
officials."'92
But,
the
section
represents
only
recommendations to college officials with no formal penalties for
violating its spirit or letter. "However, administrators looking for
guidance as to what will make Congress happy (and continue
federal support for higher education) might be expected to be
sensitive to these requests and make some effort to meet the
requirements.""'
E. Shortcomings of Alternative Approaches
While some courts and legislative bodies have recognized the
importance of free expression on the private college campus, the
methods of addressing the legal issues below a constitutional level
suffer from several practical and theoretical shortcomings. This
section of the article analyzes those shortcomings as a prelude to
proposing a balancing approach to applying the First Amendment
to private universities.
Most importantly, cobbling together various statutory, policybased, contractual, common law and state constitutional
approaches to protecting press rights leaves a considerable
number of students and faculty without legal protection. Even in
states whose constitutions appear to provide more protection for
speech freedoms than the federal Constitution, state courts have
interpreted nearly identical constitutional provisions in widely
divergent ways,' resulting in a great deal of uncertainty as to
what "speech" is or which "speech" should be protected. Even the
SPLC, which helps students at private schools explore alternatives
to the federal Constitution in protecting their rights, concedes
these alternative methods will leave many students fighting an
uphill battle at private institutions. The SPLC has noted that
"[O]fficial control of student journalists at many private schools
remains a legal and practical reality."'95 While students "who find
themselves victims of censorship and prior restraint should not

Id. at § 1011 (b).
192. Press Release by Student Press Law Center, New Education Act Will
Have Major Impact on Campus Media (Oct. 7, 1998), available at
http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=82&year=1998 (last visited Oct. 15,

2002).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER, LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS 73 (1994).
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give in quietly," SPLC cannot argue that alternative protections
are anything better than "potentially strong" counterarguments to
college officials.196 In short, officials bent on silencing the student
press at the private university have wide latitude to accomplish
their purposes.
Beyond the practical considerations are the philosophical
issues raised by the limits placed on expression. Constitutional
law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky, a leading advocate of extending
First Amendment protections to students and faculty at private
universities, notes that a judicial refusal to apply First
Amendment rights in this context signals that expression is
somehow less important than rulings applying constitutional
standards of affirmative action and anti-discrimination to private
universities. 9 7 Indeed, Chemerinsky has argued that, "Just as
private schools should not be allowed to discriminate, nor should
they be able to discipline students or teachers in violation of the
First Amendment or without procedural due process. " "'
Chemerinsky finds no evidence that speech rights are of less
political and social value than the values supported by antidiscrimination laws,9 nor does he find that imposing the First
Amendment on private universities would be of any more of a
than applying anti-discrimination or affirmative action
burden
200
laws.
Further, Chemerinsky faults existing doctrine for declaring
that the First Amendment rights of institutions should always
trump those of individuals. Taking issue with so-called
"communitarian" approaches to free speech that theorize that
individual expressive rights should give way to those of
institutions attempting to inculcate values of tolerance, diversity
and civility on campus, Chemerinsky argues that universities are
not truly communities in which members equally share
responsibilities for maintaining order and social cohesion.2 1
A university the size of the University of Southern California
is hardly a community in any meaningful way. If the
president of the university orders me fired for my speech
activities, it is not likely an exercise of communitarian selfbut rather an institution firing a dissident for
determination,
02
his speech.
Indeed,
196.
197.
198.
18, at
199.
200.
201.

most

private

and

public

universities-if

Id.
Supra notes 143-61 and accompanying text.
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Private Schools, supra note
286.
Id. at 284-86.
Chemerinsky, More Speech is Better, supra note 18, at 1642.
Id. at 1639.

202. Id.
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communitarian in any sense at all-are much more hierarchical
than more traditional geographical and political communities. A
system of tenure and ranking among faculty assures that senior
faculty wield more power in institutional decision-making than do
junior faculty. Students have little, if any, real power in making
decisions regarding the writing and implementation of academic,
student life, and institutional development policies that affect
their education and life on campus. A private university, in many
respects, more accurately resembles a benevolent dictatorship
than it does a democratic community. In such an atmosphere, it is
easy to see why administrators would wish to silence expression
that, in addition to offending members of the "community," may
embarrass the administration, faculty, and wealthy patrons of the
institution. It also serves to illustrate how free speech and press
serve an important institutional function at private universities.
Chemerinsky further argues that censorship is not the means
of fostering community in the private university, nor do
communitarian interests dictate institutional concerns should
always prevail in determining whether to protect offensive or
embarrassing expression. More speech is better than less, he
argues, and while private universities do have an interest in
expressing their own messages of tolerance and inclusionmessages public institutions likely could not espouse-they should
not be permitted to do so by silencing others." 3 Ultimately,
Chemerinsky writes, denying First Amendment protections to
private-university students tolerates a violation of one of the
fundamental values in American political culture.0 4
Other commentators argue that conceptualizing higher
education as an essentially private activity immune from
constitutional protection is part of a larger public-private
distinction in American law that fails to acknowledge the power
imbalances private parties can exercise over individuals in an
increasingly privatized American culture. Daphne Barak-Srez
critiques the traditional public-private distinction as "really
another form of Lochnerism," '° a reference to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Lochner v. New York."' The Court in Lochner invalidated
a New York law setting a maximum number of hours that bakers
could work because it violated the constitutional right of bakers to
make contracts with their employers. Underlying the Court's
reasoning was its belief that individual employees could negotiate
terms of employment on equal footing with private employers.
203. Id.
204. Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Private Schools, supra note 18, at

281.
205. Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization,
45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1186 (1995).
206. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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The critique of this narrow view of the power of the private
sector has reached into Supreme Court jurisprudence only in
dissent. For instance, Justice William Brennan argued in dissent
in San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic
Committee that the traditional limitations of the Constitution's
reach against private power "would be most imprudent, for it
would freeze into law a static conception of government, and our
contemporary theory of government action would cease to
resemble contemporary experience."" °7
Given the level of control private universities have over their
students' lives, the traditional role of higher education in
facilitating the marketplace of ideas, and the public function of
higher education in nourishing American society, it is clear a
private university is not simply another private actor whose
constitutional interests should always prevail in a conflict with
others over free-expression. The next section of the article sets out
a proposal for recognizing a limited First Amendment right for
students at private institutions.
III. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL FOR LIMITED FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION FOR STUDENT JOURNALISTS AT PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES

Any articulation of a federal First Amendment right for
students and faculty at private universities faces several daunting
challenges. Not only does such an argument go against existing
doctrine, it also admittedly runs against the grain of a
conservative judiciary that in recent years has privileged more
private behavior as being beyond the reach of the Constitution.
One reason for this judicial unwillingness can perhaps be found in
the nature of the arguments of free-expression advocates. Many
advocates for First Amendment rights on private university
campuses argue the right should be as extensive as that granted to
students at public institutions."' Thus we have a divide of
propositions on the question; critics of existing doctrine often
argue the rights of individuals should be paramount to those of
private educational institutions, while supporters argue
institutional rights should always prevail.
But the First Amendment is not always an "all or nothing"
proposition. While so-called "political" speech is granted the
from government
of protection
possible level
highest
207. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 549
n.1 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208. See Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Private Schools, supra note 18,
at 286-87 (advocating for extending First Amendment rights to private
See also Siegel, supra note 74, at 1387-94 (arguing First
campuses).
Amendment protections be applied to private universities); Schubert, supra

note 96, at 352 (arguing students at private universities should have First
Amendment protections).
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interference,"' other forms of speech, most notably "commercial"
expression, are granted limited First Amendment rights in
recognition of the need to balance the rights of speakers against
other important government interests.210 Certainly, private
institutions of higher education have important interests-such as
the articulation of communitarian, political, or religious valuesthat public institutions cannot hold. Even though American higher
education has become more secularized during the past century,
private institutions should have latitude to communicate their
values to prospective students and parents, donors, alumni and
the public. Accordingly, those interests should be considered in the
balancing of interests that would accompany a First Amendment
claim against a private institution.
Rather than permitting private university officials to censor
student media at will, an approach more consistent with the
values of higher education and democracy would be to examine the
competing interests in a free-expression claim at a private
university. Such a balancing approach pits the free-press interests
of student journalists against the legitimate pedagogical and
philosophical interests underlying the educational missions of
private universities. Thus, private university officials should be
granted some level of deference in regulating speech and
publication that would undermine the legitimate and stated
mission of the university.
For example, a sincere desire on the part of university
officials to protect marginalized students from personal
harassment should be entitled to deference. Limitations on speech
and press that flow from an institution's need to indoctrinate
students for religious training should also be entitled to deference.
Seminaries, for example, often require subordination of student
and faculty opinion to the "received wisdom" of the faith. The
balancing advocated here would respect that institutional need
209. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan is the landmark libel case in which the Supreme Court
brought the law of libel under the umbrella of the First Amendment for the
purpose of strictly scrutinizing libel claims by public officials. Id. Justice
Brennan wrote: "[Wie consider this case against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials." Id. at 270.
210. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1973)
(holding that government may regulate
nonmisleading commercial speech, which includes most advertising, to
advance substantial government interests in protecting consumers and
promoting accurate advertising and marketing communication). But see 44

Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island., 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (extending
protection for truthful commercial speech, holding that government may
regulate it only to advance a compelling government interest).

2002]

Freedom of the Private-UniversitySchool Press

and insulate it from constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, some
defenders of expression rights at private universities recognize
that an unlimited First Amendment right would clearly prevent
some institutions from fulfilling their missions. For example, Hyde
and Fishman noted the Collegiate Speech Protection Act would
have exempted universities that "have undertaken a unique and
special mission to preserve and propagate religious truth and
morality in a secular world." '11 Examples of such institutions
exempted from the bill were schools or departments of divinity;
universities that required students, faculty, and employees to be
members of, or espouse a personal belief in, a religion that controls
the institution; or schools explicitly stating in their mission
statements a commitment to the doctrines of such a religion.1 2 A
central idea in such institutions is that students entering the
university understand they are entering an environment in which
freedom of speech and press, as conceptualized by the First
Amendment, is not applicable.
Most private institutions, however, do not acknowledge or
make clear any differences that distinguish their campuses from
public universities as far as rights of free expression are
concerned. Absent such an acknowledgement or promulgation,
private-university officials should not be permitted to silence
speech that is "merely unpopular or offensive to the authorities.""'
The scenarios sketched at the beginning of this article all involved
attempts by school officials to eliminate embarrassing speech that
did not implicate the educational missions or values of the
institution. In such instances, the scale should tip in favor of
students who seek to inform the public about the workings of the
institution.
Helpful to a student journalist's case would be evidence the
university has granted students freedoms similar, if not identical,
to those granted to students at public universities. Such evidence
could be found by examining mission statements,4 matriculation
agreements, faculty and student handbooks, student-media

211. Hyde & Fishman, supra note 183, at 1498.
212. Id. at 1499 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
EXPLANATION OF FORM #639A, at 4 (1977)). As Hyde and Fishman note, the
definition of such institutions "is taken almost word for word from Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972." Id. at 1499, n.146.
213. O'Neil, supra note 64, at 192.
214. While mission statements of private institutions vary, many make
reference to a spirit of free inquiry on campus that are virtually identical to
those found at public institutions. For example, the mission statement of
Simpson College, the employer of the author of this paper, bills the institution
as supporting a "teaching and learning process [which enables] students.., to
develop critical intellectual skills [by which they may] grow as free,
responsible [and] fulfilled individuals in the world of family, work, service and
scholarship." SIMPSON COLLEGE GENERAL CATALOG 6 (2001-2003).
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charters or other statements on academic freedom.21 Few, if any,
universities proclaim a right to censor, or even regulate speech in
their promotional materials or policies, leading most students to
assume their rights are similar, if not identical, to the rights of
students at public universities. Constitutional law should reflect
this common understanding.
When journalistic and institutional interests clash, the
approach of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Schmid. 6
could be modified to provide a method by which the interests of the
student press could be balanced against those of the private
university. While Schmid dealt with the distribution of political
leaflets on a private campus, the questions in the Schmid inquiry
could easily be adapted for use with the student press:
a What is the normal function of free expression on the
campus?
Does the institution enshrine values, explicitly or implicitly
promoting a spirit of free inquiry and expression? Or are students
and faculty admonished to subordinate free-expression interests to
other institutional concerns?
* What is the nature and extent of the students' invitation to
speak and write freely on campus?
Do college policies and procedures grant students the right to
speak and write on matters of institutional concern? The existence
of an academic or student-media "bill of rights" would indicate the
institution has implied that it will respect the rights of student
journalists and others to comment on and dissent from the
dominant powers of the institution. The existence of policies to the
contrary would indicate that the institution has not desired to
abandon, in Kennedy's words, governance "by policies aimed at
infusing the student body with the college's overarching religious
or ideological commitments. " "'
e What is the compatibility of free-speech interests with the

215. University catalogs and other promotional materials often make
reference to student "freedoms" that, at the very least, imply that students
will enjoy the same rights as those granted to students at public institutions.
For instance, the Simpson College catalog notes:
Simpson seeks to provide a climate of learning in which students may

identify and accomplish their own goals within the context of a dynamic
academic community. The College's educational programs rest on the
conviction that creative self-realization, sensitivity to values and issues,
knowledge of our heritage, and a critical awareness of the relationship of
the individual to society are best engendered by freedom with
responsibility.
Id. (emphasis added).

216. 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980).
217. Kennedy, supra note 72, at B2.
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normal conduct of the university?

18

As noted in a comparison of the Schmid and Tate cases
above,219 not all private universities bill themselves as forums for
the unrestrained debate of matters of public interest. A large
number of private institutions specialize in training for religious
vocations or specific job-related skills. The existence of a
marketplace of ideas seems less essential to the conduct of such
institutions, and they should be granted more deference in
regulating speech on campus than should be non-profit
institutions of the liberal arts and science, where the consideration
of ideas is central to their missions.
Such a balance helps advance the legitimate pedagogical and
philosophical value systems of some private institutions, while
granting student journalists much wider discretion in publishing
information of public interest but that university officials may
easily suppress under the existing doctrine. As an added attraction
for private universities, the granting of a First Amendment right
of free press for students would absolve those institutions of
liability for content in student publications. Whether private
universities can be held liable for the publications of student
journalists is uncertain. Public universities are generally held not
liable because they lack the constitutional authority to review the
content of student publications. 20 However, at least one trial court
has ruled a private university may well be liable for acts of
student organizations over which it "has the power to exercise
control," even if it refuses to exercise such control.'
Such a balance would also advance a Meiklejohnian
interpretation of the First Amendment. Named for philosopher
Alexander Meiklejohn, who argued for an absolutist interpretation
of the First Amendment during post-World War II repression of
leftist speakers on campuses and elsewhere, the approach argues
218. Schmid, 423 A.2d at 630.
219. Supra notes 142-57 and accompanying text.
220. See Mazart v. State, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600, 606 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (stating that
no principal-agent relationship exists where the principal has no right of
control over agent's actions, even when public university grants office space
and janitorial services to student newspaper). See also Milliner v. Turner, 436
So. 2d 1300, 1302 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the Constitution only
allows the state university to exercise advisory control over the paper and
exempts the university from liability).
221. Wallace v. Weiss, 372 N.Y.S.2d 416, 422 (Sup. Ct. 1975). The trial court
concluded that the nature and extent of the University of Rochester's liability
for content of a magazine created by students was a matter for a jury to decide
at trial. Indeed, one commentator has argued that vicarious liability should be
imposed on private universities for the actionable speech of their students
because they are not barred by the First Amendment from censoring student
media. See Tort Liability of a University for Libelous Material in Student
Publications, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1083 (1973) (explaining when vicarious

liability applies to student newspapers).
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that the purpose of the First Amendment is to protect speech to
ensure the existence of a viable public sphere in which selfgovernment can take place.222 Initially, the Meiklejohnian theory
applied only to speech directly connected to the activities of
government, but he eventually developed the theory to encompass
four broad classes of speech deserving of the fullest level of First
Amendment protection. 3 One of the four classes was speech that
takes place on the college campus.
Education, in all its phases, is the attempt to so inform and
cultivate the mind and will of a citizen that he shall have the
wisdom, the independence, and, therefore, the dignity of a
governing citizen. Freedom of education is, thus, as we all
recognize, a basic postulate in the planning of a free society.2 '
Simply put, the private higher educational institution is
unlike most other private owners of property. It dedicates itself to
enlightening its students, promoting the exchange of ideas among
individuals and groups, and providing intellectual forums for the
discussion of issues of public concern. In many instances, the
general public is invited to participate. Also, an unfettered student
press is clearly a crucial element in the pursuit of these goals on a
private campus. Indeed, when one combines the factors above with
the variety of justifications often provided for finding "state action"
in the behavior of private discriminators, First Amendment values
come even more into play.22 While the work product of student
journalists often falls short of their professional counterparts in
terms of quality and judgment, constitutional values dictate the
First Amendment should protect their work at least in some
instances.
The important point is that there must be respect for speech
and press rights in the absence of a significant and articulated
institutional interest. As Chemerinsky put it, "[ilnstitutions still
can express their own messages, they just cannot do so by
22
silencing others.""
This maxim holds true at both public and
private universities. As one critic of existing doctrine, Elizabeth
Mertz, has argued, "[i]f a scholar [at] a private university proposes
222.

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,

FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF

GOVERNMENT 17 (1948).
223. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP.
CT. REV. 245, 256-57.
224. Id. at 257. The other classes of speech that Meiklejohn would protect
absolutely are philosophy and science, literature and the arts, and public
discussion of public issues. Id.
225. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 849 (1982) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing in dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall stated that the
presence of a combination of state-action indicia should be sufficient to extend
constitutional protections to private actors, even if no one indicator is
compelling enough to conclude that state action exists).
226. Chemerinsky, More Speech is Better, supra note 18, at 1642.
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an unconventional but potentially enlightening theory and is
censored, our country is no less deprived of enlightenment because
a private rather than a public university acted as censor. " "

227. Elizabeth Mertz, The Burden of Proof and Academic Freedom:
Protectionfor Institutionor Individual?,82 Nw. U. L. REV. 492, 526 (1988).

